

STRATEGY
RESEARCH
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**NATIONAL ASSISTANCE
AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS:
THE GAP IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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NATION ASSISTANCE AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE GAP IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

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The Department of Defense (DoD) is not properly preparing the U.S. Armed Forces to execute Civil-Military Operations (*CMO*) as a supporting, mission activity of *Nation Assistance*. Furthermore, the DoD appears to be unaware of this shortcoming and thus incapable of solving the problem due to a general lack of education and awareness regarding *Nation Assistance* and its component activities.

This argumentative paper evaluates the national security policy area of *Nation Assistance* and one of the stated component activities, *CMO*. It traces the genesis of *CMO* from the President's National Security Strategy through the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) National Military Strategy to a break in the linkage at Service level. Civil-Military Operations are defined as the complex of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. The methodology used in this evaluation is the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) *Ends, Ways, and Means* model for developing National Strategy; i.e., *Ends* being the objectives, *Ways* the concepts, and *Means* the resources available. The term *CMO* comprises five mission activities: populace and resources control, foreign nation support, humanitarian assistance, military civic action, and civil defense.

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense (DoD) is not adequately preparing the U.S. Armed Forces to execute Civil-Military Operations (*CMO*) as a supporting mission activity of *Nation Assistance*. Furthermore, the DoD is unaware of this deficiency and thus incapable of solving the problem due to a general lack of awareness and education regarding *Nation Assistance* and its component activities.

This argumentative paper evaluates the national security policy area of *Nation Assistance* and one of its stated component activities, *CMO*. Civil-Military Operations are defined as "the complex of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups."¹ The umbrella term *CMO*² currently comprises five mission activities: populace and resources control³, foreign nation support⁴, humanitarian assistance⁵, military civic action⁶, and civil defense⁷.

The methodology used in this evaluation is the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) *Ends, Ways, and Means* model for developing national strategy; i.e., *ends* being the objectives, *ways* the concepts,

¹Department of the Army, Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, (Washington: Department of the Army, 11 January 1993), Glossary-5.

²Ibid., 1-2.

³These programs consist of curfews, movement restrictions, resettlement of dislocated civilians, licensing, rations control, and inspection of facilities.

⁴The preferred means for closing the gap in combat service support requirements is to secure goods and services locally. The term FNS includes both host nation support and third country support.

⁵A group of programs that authorize the use of DoD resources to conduct military acts and operations of a humanitarian nature.

⁶MCA projects result in populace support for the government's programs. Units conduct MCA programs to enhance effectiveness, legitimacy, and image of the government and/or military.

⁷CD deals with the immediate emergency conditions created by an attack or natural or manmade disasters.

and *means* the resources available⁸. The model incorporates the implication that any U.S. Government (USG)-sponsored effort undertaken in the realm of U.S. national interests, should have at its core, a balanced and orchestrated effort from the three main elements of national power . . . not simply the one which is easiest to broker diplomatically, expends the least amount of monetary or other economic aid, and/or commits the least amount of military men and materiel over the shortest period of time. The intent herein is to trace the genesis of *CMO* from its roots within the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) through the National Military Strategy (NMS) to the individual Professional Military Education (PME) systems of the Services.

THE ARGUMENT

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT. In this public document, the President and National Security Adviser articulate the rationale and components for the NSS. The report "explains the three central components of our strategy of engagement and enlargement."⁹ From the perspective of the USAWC model, the ends/objectives, simply stated, are: **enhanced security, global economic growth, and promotion of democracy abroad.** These three ends/objectives are broad, general, and indeed encompass the three elements of national power--military, economic, and diplomatic. These ends/objectives also provide the required direction and guidance for the development of supporting USG agency strategies. This NSS further outlines, in very general terms, the ways/concepts of executing the strategy with the national resources/means available.

⁸Although not stated within the USAWC model, the author assumes "resources available" refers specifically to personnel and units which are operationally capable, i.e. trained and ready, and logically sustainable--not simply units available for deployment.

⁹The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," February 1995, 2-3.

The NSS objective of *enhanced security* invites flexibility in the development of peacetime engagement. Although somewhat disjointed in certain areas, the NSS does incorporate, in broad guidance, the elements of national power. The objective of *enhanced security* thus becomes a catalyst for developing strategies which will hopefully preclude U.S. involvement in armed conflict abroad. Translated further into *peacetime engagement*, this objective becomes the genesis for those activities which engage foreign civil authorities and military forces within a peacetime scenario to better understand the factors bearing on their existence. Thus *CMO*, as a supporting mission activity of *nation assistance*, derives its origin from this stated NSS objective. The sub-mission activities of *CMO* previously mentioned certainly support the ends/objectives of the NSS.

THE SECDEF'S ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS. In support of the President's NSS, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) states in his most recent report "The NSS recognizes both that the world continues to confront the United States with serious threats and that interdependence is an inescapable reality. To protect and advance U.S. interests, then, the USG must be able to influence the policies and actions of others beyond its borders. This mandates that the U.S. remains engaged abroad, particularly in regions where its most important interests are at stake."¹⁰

In his supporting DoD strategy, SECDEF Perry delineates specific guidance for the conduct of *CMO*, Civil Affairs (CA) operations, and the training of forces taking part in these operations.¹¹ In this directive, the SECDEF directs the Service Secretaries, military departments, and Unified Combatant Commanders, *inter alia*, to organize, train, equip, and deploy forces capable of supporting *CMO* among other missions.

¹⁰William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1995), 2.

¹¹_____, "Secretary of Defense Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs," (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995), 1-3.

In a recent in-depth interview on this same subject with the current Vice President, Civil Affairs Association (CAA), Colonel (Retired) Eli E. Nobleman, the question was asked: "The SECDEF recently promulgated Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs. Yet, none of our Service schools incorporate CA, use of CA forces, or *CMO* within their core curriculum. Unless rectified, the Service schools will continue to breed mid-level and senior leaders and staff officers who have no knowledge of how this valuable asset can help commanders in executing their responsibilities to civilians." Question: Is it appropriate for the CAA to weigh-in and facilitate correcting this shortcoming and if so, how might that occur? COL Nobleman's answer: "In fact the CAA has tried in various offices, informally, but to no avail. It is the greatest problem we [the Civil Affairs community] have. I checked with Holmes' [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict] office and they said it's just a directive, like any other Pentagon directive. No Pentagon office enforces directives like this and any other areas in the field. It's just a directive. There it is. It's authority for people who *want* to do something. Most of the problem goes back to the defense department schools not teaching the subject [CA]. I have told people it needs to be taught in the basic schools. Nothing has been done. The CAA cannot weigh-in here. It is not really appropriate [for this private organization]."¹²

The SECDEF, in analyzing and narrowing the focus of the NSS, has provided relatively succinct, clear, and unambiguous guidance regarding the ability to deploy trained forces capable of executing *CMO*. The SECDEF's directive also provides flexibility in the *ways/concepts* the Services are to reach the point of readiness regarding *CMO*. The *means/resources* are within the Services' capability, however, the desire and will to teach *CMO* in Service schools from basic to strategic level

¹²Colonel (Retired) Eli E. Nobleman, former National President, and, since 1969, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Civil Affairs Organization; Honorary Colonel of the Corps Regiment[CA], former *Counsel Emeritus*, Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, and the 13th recipient of the USSOCOM Medal for Lifetime Support of Special Operations; interview by author, 1 November 1995, Bethesda, Maryland.

appears not. Nonetheless, from an analytical perspective, there is continuity between the NSS and the SECDEF's Bottoms-Up-Review and Annual Report.

THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY (NMS). In support of the NSS and SECDEF's guidance and directives, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in coordination with the Unified Combatant Commanders and Service chiefs, established two national military *ends/objectives*: **promoting stability and thwarting aggression**. Among the stated components of the NSS is *peacetime engagement*. As stated in the NMS, "Overseas presence and power projection provide the basis for executing the tasks required by our strategy. The first group of these tasks, *peacetime engagement*, describes a broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces that demonstrates commitment, improves collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and in many other ways enhance regional stability."¹³ The CJCS further narrows and defines the components of *peacetime engagement* as: military-to-military contacts, *nation assistance*, security assistance, humanitarian assistance, counter-drug and counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping.¹⁴ As further highlighted by the CJCS, these *nation assistance* activities are designed to assist friendly nations as they combat lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency . . . Specific activities that involve our Armed Forces include bilateral and multilateral exercises, **civil-military operations**, intelligence and communications sharing, and logistics support.¹⁵

Although not specifically stated in USAWC terminology, the intent of the CJCS is clear and concise for the Unified Combatant Commanders and Service chiefs to support. The CJCS has further

¹³The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995), 8.

¹⁴Ibid., 8-9.

¹⁵Ibid.

narrowed the focus and clearly translated and established the ends/objectives (promoting stability and thwarting aggression), the ways/concepts (peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our nation's wars), and the resources/means (a force capable of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously). To this point, there appears to be continuity and consensus among the President, SECDEF, CJCS, Unified Combatant Commanders and Service chiefs regarding *CMO*. Beyond this point, however, the continuity begins to unravel. The Services truly believe they are in complete concert with the Chairman's guidance. Their interpretations, manifested in respective doctrinal approaches, exhibits a *cultural reluctance* to grasp the *CMO* mission activity and make it a tangible portion of any officer professional military education. The Services certainly believe they have the *potential* to conduct *CMO*; what is lacking, however, is the understanding that this *potential* exists only if it becomes a *validated capability*, i.e., they actually have forces organized, trained, and prepared to execute *CMO*.

The discontinuity is the fact that the *ways/concepts* (peacetime engagement and its stated sub-tasks) and the *means/resources* are out of balance. For whatever reason, the Services diminish the value of this type operation--perhaps because it detracts from their particular warfighting missions. The Services have thus chosen, whether consciously or unconsciously, to omit *CMO* as a core subject in every primary level officers' school except for Army SOF. The Unified Combatant Commanders and Service chiefs either naively believe that any uniformed force can conduct *CMO* or they are unaware that the aspects of coordinating with civilians, civilian authorities, non-military organizations and/or agencies in a military area of operations call for either trained specialists or general knowledge on the part of the commander in charge. This lack of understanding *CMO* belies another problem--the real dilemma: the *means/resources*. Indeed the Services have the assets and the necessary budget. But a thorough understanding of *CMO* and the correct use of assets suited to support *CMO* is never

realized because the Services do not include *CMO* within their officer primary military education core curricula.

After Action Reports of Operations Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq/Southern Turkey), Continue/Restore Hope (Somalia), Sea Angel (Bangladesh), Uphold/Maintain Democracy (Haiti), Able Sentry (Bosnia-Herzegovina), *inter alia*, indicate a common deficiency regarding *CMO* and attest to the lack of understanding by commanders charged with the responsibility to conduct *CMO*. That common thread which weaves so subtly through After Action Reports/Lessons Learned is that units which have no understanding or experience with *CMO* muddle along, using trial and error techniques, until quasi-success is achieved. But this is not commensurate with either the American civilian or DoD *modus operandi*. Educators, athletic coaches, and military commanders at all levels constantly speak of the transition from training performance to actual execution performance, i.e., executing the same way in practice as in actual operations. But for *CMO* there is usually no practice. In most cases, the only time commanders come in contact with *CMO* is during actual operations.

Why do the Service chiefs and theater Unified Combatant Commanders allow this to continue? The proper laboratories for *trial and error techniques* are field training exercises, command post exercises, computer-assisted exercises, etc. The time lost between deployment and success via trial and error is, in most cases, critical to mission success. This *should* serve as a wake-up call for the Service chiefs and theater Unified Combatant Commanders to either reflect inward and realize this deficiency or indicate to the CJCS that they has neither the time nor understanding of *CMO* in order to push it into becoming a core subject.

THE JOINT STAFF GUIDANCE. Joint Publication 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs*, addresses the use of CA assets in planning and conducting joint CA/CMO activities across the range of military operations. Additionally, it emphasizes that the term *CMO* is a broad, generic term used to denote the decisive and timely application of military capabilities to enhance the relationship between the military and civilian populace in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander's mission.¹⁶ It further defines the range of *CMO* from support of combat operations to traditional non-military roles assisting countries in bringing about political, economic, and social stability.¹⁷ This publication is the definitive and authoritative document concerning joint *CMO* and the use of CA assets in supporting such missions. It maintains continuity with the NSS, further focuses the SECDEF/CJCS concept of *peacetime engagement* and *nation assistance*, and further supports the NMS. Nonetheless, as comprehensive and focused as Joint Pub 3-57 is, it is only read, as is any military publication, by those who have both knowledge of and a direct interest in the subject matter. In this case, by units having assigned *CMO* staff officers the CA community, and rarely by any organization conducting *CMO*.

THE MISSING LINK

The educational link between the NMS guidance and what the Services should teach is the CJCS Military Education Policy Document.¹⁸ The MEPD "defines the objectives and policies of the

¹⁶The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 21 June 1995), I-1.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Education Policy Document (MEPD), CM-1618-93, (Washington: GPO, March 23, 1993)

CJCS regarding the schools, colleges, and other educational institutions that make up the military education system of the Armed Forces. Additionally, it identifies the fundamental responsibilities of the major participants in the military education arena in achieving desired educational goals.¹⁹ The MEPD further identifies five (5) levels of military education--precommissioning, primary, intermediate, senior, and general/flag. A brief synopsis follows:

Precommissioning refers to military education received at institutions that produce commissioned officers upon graduation. Its institutions are: Service academies, ROTC units at civilian universities, and OCS and OTS.

Primary refers to education typically received at grades O-1 through O-3. The focus is on the rudiments of military science: Service values, Service missions and organization, military history, conceptual awareness of the levels of war, and an introduction to tactics at the unit level. Primary also refers to military education received at institutions that teach basic and advanced branch or warfare; its institutions are: basic or advanced branch or warfare specialty schools, skill-related PME courses, and continuing professional education. The focus is on Service values, developing warfighting skills, enhancing leadership and decision-making ability, and improving management and communication skills. "Proficiency in warfare specialties is stressed, as well as the tactical employment of military units to achieve specific battlefield objectives."²⁰

Intermediate refers to education received at: Service PME institutions (Air Command and Staff College, Army Command & General Staff Officers Course (C&GSOC), College of Naval Command and Staff, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Service college nonresident courses, PME

¹⁹Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Military Education Policy Document", (Washington: Government Printing Office, 23 March 1993), I-1.

²⁰MEPD, II-6.

courses of study or fellowships granted equivalence by individual Services. The focus is on large unit warfighting within the context of operational art.²¹

Senior refers to education received at: Service PME institutions (Army War College, College of Naval Warfare, Marine Corps War College, Air War College, Service college nonresident courses, PME courses of study or fellowships granted equivalence by individual Services, and the Joint PME institutions (National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces). The focus is on strategy--the plan that translates power into the achievement of objectives.

General/Flag refers to education received at the Capstone course (National Defense University), Joint and Service Seminars and Courses, the National War College, and Continuing Professional Education. The focus is inherently joint in nature; on the highest levels of strategy, integrating the components of national power to achieve national objectives.²²

Thus, in concept, the following strategic linkage exists: the President/National Security Advisor and the SECDEF; the SECDEF and CJCS; and the CJCS, Unified Combatant Commanders, and the Service Chiefs. But not from the Service chiefs downward. This then, becomes the decisive point in analyzing and solving any educational problem or discrepancy relating to *CMO*. The current status of *CMO* instruction in the Service schools follows.

²¹MEPD, II-7, 8,

²²Ibid., II-10.

SUPPORTING EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING STRATEGIES

THE ARMY. As in most systems founded and maintained on hierachial structure, some higher headquarters exercises the responsibility to derive roles and missions; formulate, promulgate, and disseminate guidance; and monitor subordinate elements as execution occurs. Subordinate elements and supporting organizations/agencies, in turn, develop supporting policies, directives, etc., to ensure full compliance and integration at every level between the lowest level unit in the chain of command and the headquarters providing the initial guidance. It is reasonable then to expect that in a hierachial system such as the military, the Services and supporting USG agencies would, unless directed otherwise, develop supporting doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, etc., to ensure complete compliance.

THE ARMY. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), in this case, receives guidance from two distinct authorities: the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense as translated by the Chairman's National Military Strategy. The Army has a unique organization to review current guidance and envision future training requirements: The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), located at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

The TRADOC focuses not only on training today's *conventional or general purpose* soldier, but also on capabilities, roles, missions, and training requirements required for future roles and missions. The current and future operational vision of the Army, theoretically supporting the Chairman's NMS and thus completing the formal linkage between the Army and the SECDEF, is promulgated in the Army's keystone Field Manual 100-5, Operations. In reference to *Nation Assistance*, this document

states "The Army is *competent* in many areas, *such as nation assistance, . . .*"²³ But this statement belies the real question, "Is the Army really competent-- just because it says that it is?"

Supporting U.S. Army FM 100-5, Operations is the keystone manual on training, FM 25-100, Training The Force (1992). This training manual is the Army's keystone manual for setting forth training strategy, defining mission essential tasks, and envisioning what skills the force might require to fight tomorrow's wars and protect U.S. interests. It promulgates the essence of what the Army has learned about training forces over the last 200+ years. It is, based on all criteria, an excellent "how to do it" manual. It coaches leaders at all levels to define their wartime missions (as dictated by existing or perceived warplans) as tasks and analyze them considering current guidance from their peacetime chain of command. From this comparison comes a list of *essential* tasks required to support the next war or contingency operation. Following this blueprint, today's commander/leader can pinpoint what capabilities will be required (and obviously what shortfalls currently exist). Once these requirements are defined, the leader then assesses his particular unit's ability to execute these under wartime conditions. If this assessment of tasks provides some individual "untrained" comments, the leader then develops a training plan to address these shortcomings. The process has proven to be excellent, with a major exception; *leaders don't know what they don't know*, i.e., it is currently unrealistic and certainly unreasonable to expect today's leaders to visualize civil-military tasks when they have, through the normal course of their military development and education, never been exposed to it.

The Army concluded that this training philosophy and doctrine would work when applied to trained and educated leaders at all levels. But the terms "trained and educated" are relative terms. It seems that in validating the term "trained", the Army had not envisioned a requirement to identify and incorporate the skills required to conduct *CMO*. In theory, the Army developed its training philosophy

²³Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 1-4.

and doctrine in a sound manner, albeit the oversight previously mentioned. The oversight manifested itself in the capability statement previously mentioned. In summary, the Army seems to have confused capability with enthusiasm. From a methodology standpoint, it is unknown what types of studies were used to develop this training philosophy and doctrine. It is reasonable to assume, however, that data used came from leaders at all levels, under combat and other conditions. From a *CMO* standpoint, the studies used did not adequately demonstrate validity and reliability due to the reasons cited previously. The Army may have actually perceived *CMO* skills as a weakness but left it up to unit commanders for "unit/on-the-job-training". That part of the history of FM 25-100 is unknown. On the other hand, the Army may have realized this shortcoming, developed plans to correct its deficiency, but concluded that on a priority basis, *CMO* did not deserve a place in leader education core curricula. In the case of *CMO* training, *consensus* may have been the culprit. Since the promulgation of this training document, the Army has been queried as to why *CMO* has not been incorporated in core curricula. The answer, whether diplomatic or candid, was always the same: *consensus* that "other skills had priority . . . we must make the best use of our resources, in support of the most people, in the shortest amount of time." It seems reasonable, then, to assume the Army's research led to a discussion of the subject, but that *consensus* won out over vision.

The actual rationale for the Army's statement in FM 100-5, however, is not provided in this document. Based on numerous operational and exercise After Action Reports regarding *CMO*, *competent* may be a misleading if not *incorrect* term. Interestingly, this same document neither contains the term *CMO* nor even implies that *CMO* exists within the scope of operations across the operational spectrum. It is reasonable to conclude then, based on the stated NMS:

- that the Army has analyzed the NMS, understands the terms nation assistance and *CMO* as defined by the SECDEF/CJCS and believes no further action is required to ensure compliance; inherent soldier skills will suffice, either across the spectrum of soldier skills or within certain *CMO*-oriented units, e.g., civil affairs, or
- that the Army has analyzed the NMS, has a different interpretation of nation assistance/*CMO* than does the SECDEF/CJCS and believes no further action is required to ensure compliance; inherent soldier skills will suffice, either across the spectrum of soldier skills or within certain *CMO*-oriented units, e.g., civil affairs, or
- that the Army has analyzed the NMS, understands the terms nation assistance and *CMO* as defined by the SECDEF/CJCS but currently does not possess the resources or time to incorporate such training into basic and advanced training courses, or
- that the Army has analyzed the NMS, understands the terms nation assistance and *CMO* as defined by the SECDEF/CJCS, understands the requirements for specific skills and understanding, but miscalculated its ability to conduct such missions without specific training, or
- that the Army has analyzed the NMS, understands the terms nation assistance and *CMO* as defined by the SECDEF/CJCS, understands the requirements for specific skills and understanding, but chooses, for whatever reasons, to not initiate actions to ensure compliance, or

- that the developers of FM 100-5 *don't know what they don't know*.

THE MARINE CORPS. The Marine Corps has recognized the need for specialists to conduct this interface with civilians and/or non-military organizations and oversee activities relating to civilian activities. In response to this recognition, it maintains two CA units in the USMC Reserve. It also adopts, to the extent applicable, the CA doctrine developed by the Army in U.S. Army FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. Numerous interviews with key training and doctrine points of contact indicate that indeed some aspects of *CMO* are covered in other blocks of instruction in the Marine Command and General Staff College, Amphibious Warfare School, and MOOTW curricula, but no specific block on *CMO*. Currently, *CMO* is not taught as a core subject in any of the officer branch schools.

THE NAVY. The fundamental objectives of the Navy are to organize, train, equip, prepare, and maintain the readiness of Navy and Marine Corps forces for the performance of military missions as directed by the President or the SECDEF.²⁴ With respect to the Operating Forces of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is responsible to train, organize, prepare, and maintain the readiness of Navy forces for assignment to unified or specified commands for the performance of military missions as directed by the President or the SECDEF.²⁵ These responsibilities are commensurate with those of the CSA and ensure continuity from the President through the SECDEF and SECNAV to the CNO. As expected, the CNO exercises command of organizations responsible for determining training

²⁴U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. "Navy and Marine Corps" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994) 2-1.

²⁵Ibid. 2-6.

requirements. The CNO, as a contributor to the development of the NMS, is responsible for ensuring that naval training programs support naval missions outlined in the NMS. The CNO delegates responsibility for these tasks to subordinate commands typically charged with functional responsibilities. This decentralized approach recognizes that the operational or functional commander is in the best position to determine/fund training requirements in support of their missions.

After receiving the NMS, the CNO passes it to these subordinate commands, who determine their respective training requirements. If funded, these training requirements become reality and are passed on to respective commanders for development and course development. Once developed, the commands then conduct the training, evaluate the training, make required adjustments, and incorporate the changes into the next iteration of the training. From the Department of the Navy organizational structure and roles and missions, it is reasonable to conclude that a mechanism does exist which enables the CNO to synthesize the NMS, develop supporting *Naval Strategy*, define and articulate the missions and tasks required to support the NMS, and develop training to teach these missions and tasks. The current and future operational vision of the Navy, theoretically supporting the Chairman's NMS and thus completing the formal linkage between the Navy and the SECDEF, is promulgated in the Navy's Forward From The Sea. In reference to nation assistance, this document states nothing. The Navy, however, like the other Services, maintains key assets²⁶ which could play important roles during *CMO*. Perhaps using the same rationale as the Army, the Navy, however, does not teach *CMO* as a core subject in any of their respective officer training schools.

THE AIR FORCE. Data from various interviews indicate that the Air Force teaches portions of *CMO*, but with caveats. The Air Command and Staff College does teach some aspects of *CMO*

²⁶The units most often used during *CMO* include, but are not limited to, military police, engineer, medical, veterinary, transportation, aviation, and logistics units.

only as a part of other blocks of instruction . . . always in the context of other operations; e.g., MOOTW, etc. In summary, the Air Force teaches certain aspects but not as a well-defined, separate block of instruction. Various aspects of *CMO* are integrated into other blocks of instruction, e.g., campaign planning, humanitarian assistance, etc. At the Primary educational level it is not a core subject. Guest speakers mention it, but the feeling is that the school doesn't rely on them as full-time, regular instructors. There is nothing *per se* on *CMO*, just some readings incorporated into the MOOTW classes.

THE USSOCOM. The USCINCSOC has a unique responsibility under Title 10, United States Code. Bearing responsibility for the training of SOF, USCINCSOC translates the NMS and provides guidance to subordinate Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations commands²⁷ for the development of supporting doctrine and courses. Like their parent Services, each of these commands contains a training institution responsible for doctrine development, training, and in some cases, research and development. The Army component of the USSOCOM, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), focuses not only on training today's Army special operations soldier²⁸, but also on refining doctrine, capabilities, roles, missions, and training requirements required for future SOF roles and missions. Based on the special operations and *CMO* lessons from every operation since WWII²⁹, USASOC provided a vision for the missions most likely to be encountered during the next 50 years, e.g., unconventional or non-conventional warfare in both pure military and civil-military

²⁷These are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).

²⁸Army SOF include Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Ranger, Special Forces, and Special Operations Aviation.

²⁹The key lessons provided by WWII encompassed those activities conducted by the Office of Strategic Services and the Civil Affairs units formed to address the myriad of problems facing GEN Eisenhower following the North African campaign of 1942.

settings. Key to this vision was understanding the people of the region and how to forge civil-military relationships, address the needs of any indigenous people and/or partisans while using the inherent knowledge of the region for internal defense and development purposes, and eventually teaching the indigenous population how to better their own situation through their own efforts and abilities. These simple truths and lessons, borne out of actual operations, and validated against those learned by the Civil Affairs/Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (CA/AMGOT) units during World War II, became the genesis of today's *CMO* doctrine. This doctrine is currently manifested into the *CMO* block of instruction within both the Special Forces Qualification Course and the CA Operations Courses taught to both Active and Reserve Component soldiers. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that these courses exist mainly for SOF--both operators and staff personnel, but certainly accessible to any other Service, regardless of branch within that Service. They focus on the *customer* foremost; in *CMO* terms this is the affected individual, city, town, or region. It is this unique focus which forms the foundation of all *CMO*. In addition to these courses, the USASOC has developed and forwarded training support packages on CA to be used in Army basic and advanced courses of Army officer training.

The Navy component of the USSOCOM, Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), having the similar collateral missions of training paramilitary forces within a civil-military environment, albeit littoral, understands the requirement to understand the civilian environment and the factors affecting operations within a civilian sector. Understandably, the NAVSPECWARCOM incorporates *CMO* in both its officer and team instruction.

The Air Force component of the USSOCOM, the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), understanding the requirement to establish and operate bases within any environment, not only understands *CMO*, but also conducts a *CMO* course at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Like the USASOC, this course is open to all Services.

THE RISK

Within the USAWC model, when or if risk is determined to be unacceptable, the strategy must be revised. The three recommended options are: reduce/remove the objectives, change the concepts, and/or increase the resources. This presents a most unique *CMO*-related dilemma. By all accounts and reasoning, the three strategies mentioned above seem sound and acceptable. Each have stated ends, ways, and means. Each have, from higher to lower level, a more narrow-focused strategy with components and mission activities more defined. And finally, each subtly suggest somewhat boastfully, that these strategies have been based on our current and projected capabilities as evidenced by our past exploits, readiness, equipment, etc. Using the USAWC model, the risk for all strategies is deemed acceptable. The model, however, does not allow for the problems presented by *CMO*. The Army has, by overstating its ability to competently execute *CMO* across the spectrum of conflict, may have mislead the CJCS, the SECDEF, and ultimately the President. The other Services simply do not mention it. The implication of this is great when one considers that the President's decisions to deploy the Armed Forces are based on recommendations provided by the SECDEF and Joint Chiefs CJCS, and Service chiefs. These recommendations are based on the force's *stated* ability to execute the missions; missions for which the parent Services bear training responsibility.

In November 1995, the author conducted a survey of USAWC students regarding their knowledge of and experience in the nation assistance and *CMO*. The survey population consisted of sixty (60) U.S. students representing 25% of the U.S. student body. Of the three-hundred twenty (320) students, two-hundred forty are USG employees--either within the Armed Forces or from another USG agency, e.g., Department of Defense, Department of State, or Central Intelligence Agency. The response rate was 75% or forty-five (45) respondents participating. The response quality was deemed satisfactory to achieve the desired results. A secondary intent of the survey was

to determine an approximate percentage of those U.S. students having knowledge of, or experience in, U.S.-sponsored or supported CMO at some time in their career and whether or not they believed their particular Service or USG agency had adequately prepared them to identify, plan for, orchestrate, and execute CMO tasks in support of U.S. national objectives. The survey obtained the following *relevant* and *key* data:

Familiarization with nation assistance	72 %
Familiarization with CMO	75 %
Familiarization with the scope of CMO	58 %
Experience with some element of CMO	47 %
Previous CMO training	14 %
Believe special skills are required to execute CMO	73 %
Knowledge of units specifically organized and trained to conduct CMO.	78 %
Knowledge of DoD schools which offer CMO instruction	25 %
Desire to attend CMO instruction	33 %
Believe any unit can execute CMO with inherent skills	27 %

The derived data/information is especially meaningful at a time when the Services are drawing-down, reviewing how they do business, train their forces, and prepare to execute the NMS under whatever circumstances arise. The results of this survey may serve as a catalyst to either include the basics of CMO in each of the Service and supporting USG agencies' officer's basic and advanced courses, or require formal CMO training prior to undertaking such missions. It is clear from the survey that many of the respondents didn't understand nation assistance and/or CMO enough to

properly answer the questions³⁰. Whether or not the Services or supporting USG agencies properly prepare their personnel to identify, plan for, orchestrate, and execute CMO tasks in support of U.S. national objectives may no longer be a question after this survey. The facts seem clear: the students attending the USAWC represent the future leaders of the Services and supporting USG agencies; they have indicated by their responses their reluctance to attend nation assistance/CMO training yet assert their belief that specialized skills are required to plan for, orchestrate, and execute nation assistance/CMO.

In a recent Washington Post article about the current peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina,³¹ various U.S. commanders reflected on their ability to deal with the unexpected. "Long schooled in the traditional art of fighting war, American commanders now find themselves grappling with political, diplomatic, and military demands that go far beyond the martial skills they were taught."³² True, this is an unusual operation--one for which today's commanders are not totally prepared. COL Gregory Fontenot, a brigade commander, may provide the best summary regarding CMO: "You find that your classical military activities are in support of and supplemental to civil functions. For instance, you have to convince the local police that it's a good thing to let somebody travel from Tuzla to Orasje, and it's an even better thing if they don't pull travellers off to the side of the road and club them . . . I haven't been trained for this. I spend a lot more time negotiating and assessing people's willingness to be cooperative than I do on traditional military tasks."³³

³⁰In many surveys, respondents made a special effort to write notes clarifying their answers or feelings about certain questions. These notes, although unsought by the author, gave a greater insight into either the knowledge or lack of it from the respondents.

³¹Atkinson, Rick. "Warriors Without A War", The Washington Post. Washington: The Washington Post, April 14, 1996, p. 1.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

John Keegan, the noted British military historian, observed the same type of dilemma in Bosnia: "This kind of thing [dealing capably with refugees, relief organizations, faction leaders, local politicians, and civilian contractors] is not really America's cup of tea, is it? For the British and French it seems to come easier. It's embedded in the ethos of their armies, because they were imperial armies dealing with bandits and warlords and that sort of thing, and the Americans weren't doing that."³⁴

Keegan's remark is reminiscent of the situation facing GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower during the North Africa campaign of WWII. Lingering doubts about the crucial role of tending to civil affairs were settled when GEN Eisenhower wrote to GEN George C. Marshall: "The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters."³⁵

Ironically, the officer whom Eisenhower charged with forging a conceptual plan to address such CMO issues was his Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, LTG Sir A.E. Grasett--a British officer. His knowledge of dealing with similar dilemmas noted by Keegan became the genesis of the first CA/AMGOT units of the U.S. Armed Forces.

PROPOSALS

The authority of the President and SECDEF are indisputable when defining roles and missions for U.S. Armed Forces. These roles and missions, however, must be translated from political intent into military terms and thus further refined and translated into workable concepts and tasks for the

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington: Center Of Military History, United States Army, 1986), 3.

Armed Forces; removing the ambiguous and nebulous portions is paramount. This step has been performed. As previously mentioned, there indeed appears to be continuity between the NSS and the guidance of the SECDEF. Likewise, linkage exists between the SECDEF's guidance and the NMS. The NMS further narrows the SECDEF focus and translates the NCA's intent even more in providing definitive and understandable mission activities. The CJCS, in translating this executive level guidance into military terms, relies on the Services to develop supporting strategy and doctrine which ensures the ability of soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen to execute such missions when notified. In retrospect, one can conclude that from the NCA through the CJCS, executive-level guidance has been admirably and adroitly translated into viable terms and concepts. Each of the Services remain comfortable in their respective vision of roles and missions and current capabilities to train the force for such missions.

There appears to be, as stated earlier, a missing link between the NMS and the Services' internal strategies and guidance regarding training their respective forces. Whether this shortcoming is an honest oversight or simply a casualty of prioritization and funding of training tasks, is beyond the scope of this document. The CJCS clearly and unambiguously has declared that *CMO* will be conducted in support of nation assistance, but there is no evidence to suggest that the Services' officer corps has received such training other than that previously mentioned. The Services have, for the most part, neither addressed nor implemented tangible programs to train, at any branch school level, officers capable of understanding, planning for, and orchestrating *CMO* in support of U.S. national objectives.

Training is the operative word in *CMO*. It is an unrealistic and poor assumption that any uniformed Service or unit can execute *CMO* as either a primary or collateral mission solely based on their *inherent soldier skills*. As today's young officers learn about Personnel Management, Security & Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Communications, they must be thoroughly prepared to either

support or command organizations charged with conducting *CMO* in the future. The time to learn and understand the many nuances of *CMO* is during the formative O-1 through O-5 years--not when tasked to establish a joint task force and conduct *CMO* as a general officer. Lack of understanding at this level, demonstrated in each Somalia, Rwanda, and even Haiti, has severely limited or had significant degradation, at least initially, on the mission from OPLAN development through force allocation, and mission execution. Even the acceptance of force deployment timelines (units conducting *CMO*) has had a negative impact.

Whichever rationale and assumptions apply, the facts remain clear that within the DoD, the only component which understands and incorporates *CMO* as a core subject in both officer and NCO professional military education courses are special operations forces. These soldiers are constantly deployed conducting operations which place them in situations requiring interface with civilians, community authorities, and foreign military organizations assisting indigenous people.

It appears reasonable to conclude then, that no declared mechanism exists to provide feedback and assurance to the CJCS regarding the degree of compliance from the theater Unified Combatant Commanders and Services. It is also reasonable to conclude, based on the NSS, that the President believes his military advisors understand the system adequately enough to ensure his guidance is properly translated into meaningful training guidance and thus manifested at the lowest level. Based on the *modus operandi* currently used by the Services to determine core training subjects, it is arguable whether this is actually happening or not.

The question is whether the requirement to teach our officers is currently being met by the Services--regardless of their respective mechanisms and institutions, and educational systems. Whether

incorporated into existing blocks of instruction or established as stand-alone blocks of instruction, the intent is the same.

CONCLUSIONS

The post-Cold War world environment has radically increased both the possibilities and requirements for the U.S. military to execute its portion of the NSS and NMS by conducting *CMO*; most of this in the form of providing support to civilians, civil authorities, and conducting *Nation Assistance*. This stands in stark contrast to its former *warrior* role of deterring war and defeating threats abroad. These increasing demands have focused primarily on the NSS mission area of *peacetime engagement* and one of its subcategories--*Nation Assistance*, and the specific mission activity--*CMO*. The facts surrounding it have been presented. But even accepting that omission from an officer's professional military education, leaders at all levels must ask the question: *Why we should incorporate CMO at all training levels?* If the previous analysis yields any usable data, it is this: the President, as Commander in Chief, has fulfilled his responsibility to his subordinates by envisioning and articulating a NSS. The SECDEF and CJCS, likewise, have promulgated clear guidance regarding the roles and missions required of the Services for the future. The guidance, tenets, and components of this strategy are broad allowing conceptual interpretation by those who must execute it. The three central components of this strategy of engagement and enlargement, **enhanced security, global economic growth, and promotion of democracy abroad** are the President's goals and thus require supporting USG departments and agencies to develop supporting goals, objectives, and specified tasks. Training, the foundation of any department or agency, is the operative word in task accomplishment.

Based on the USAWC model, the aforementioned ends/objectives also provide the required direction and guidance for the development of other USG agencies and departments' supporting strategies.

It is possible, but unlikely, that *CMO* will carry enough weight on the priority list to be fully funded and supported unless an external force causes a realignment of Service priorities.

Yet in the face of this clear, articulate, unambiguous, and mission-focused document, the Services have chosen, for the most part, to interpret the guidance so as to be in the best interests of that particular Service. In doing so, not only have they strayed from the SECDEF guidance, but also they have interrupted the linkage between the President's guidance and what he believes to be the current capabilities of the DoD. This capability becomes the crux of the argument. If it is reasonable to conclude that the NCA will continue to deploy the Armed Forces to execute *CMO* abroad in the future, then it is equally reasonable to conclude that the NCA believes the force is trained and ready to do so. This is the answer to the question.

If the Services yield to the aforementioned argument and allow external assistance in addressing and resolving the shortfall, the next question should reasonably be: *How should we incorporate CMO* at all training levels? The Services have the ability and resources to amend their officer professional military education courses to incorporate *CMO* as a core block of instruction. Whether the proposed *CMO* block of instruction is hours, weeks, or months in length is irrelevant; consider this period as an investment in the future. Realizing the reluctance of the Services to develop this block from within, the USSOCOM can provide the necessary program of instruction, instructors, and training support packages to make this period meaningful.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations, based on the aforementioned NSS and NMS, the types of operations most likely requiring DoD participation, and current capabilities and limitations of the Services, are provided as a foundation for filling the current educational gap between conventional operations conducted by a military force (either in general war or military operations other than war) and those civil-military activities precipitated as a result of that operation.

FOR THE JOINT STAFF

- Review the NMS for the specified and implied tasks; ensure linkage exists between those specified and implied tasks found in the NSS and those actually stated in the NMS.
- Review the current and proposed Military Education Policy Document for compliance with the current NMS; where discrepancies exist, amend the MEPD.
- Develop an oversight process which tracks how the Services prepare their officers to execute the missions defined and articulated by the CJCS in the NMS.

FOR THE UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDERS

- Review the current NMS for stated mission activities; define and develop Service component/functional component-specific supporting missions which enable accomplishment of the goals and objectives of the NMS.
- Review the five components of *CMO* to ensure a thorough understanding of how theater assets support these operations
- Incorporate *CMO* scenarios into theater Unified Combatant Commander-sponsored field training exercises, command post exercises, and other training exercises.

FOR USCINCSOC

- In conjunction with the Service chiefs and other supporting USG agency directors, develop a *CMO* block of instruction and/or course for use within the Services' and USG agencies officer/senior leader training courses from primary to general/flag officer level. Ensure it incorporates not only the tenets of the NMS and SECDEF Directive 2000.13 as stated herein, but also addresses how the assets of each particular Service and/or USG agency support *CMO*.
- If required, identify and provide subject matter experts, training support packages, and instructors in support of these aforementioned *CMO* blocks of instruction.

- Research the feasibility of establishing this *CMO* course of instruction within the Washington, D.C. area to capture not only Service expertise in *CMO* but also the NGO/PVO and supporting USG agency subject matter experts as well.

FOR THE SERVICE CHIEFS

- Review the current NMS for stated mission activities; define and develop Service-specific supporting missions which enable accomplishment of the goals and objectives of the NMS.
- Review SECDEF Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs for training and readiness guidance in preparation for *CMO* mission activities.
- Review current doctrine and core officer educational training tasks to ensure compliance with the NMS and SECDEF Directive 2000.13.
- Review the five components of *CMO* to ensure a thorough understanding of how each theater Unified Combatant Commander and Service component provides assets capable of supporting these operations
- Incorporate *CMO* scenarios into Service field training exercises, command post exercises, and other training exercises.

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